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NEW YORK CITY'S CHARTER REVISION:
THE POLITICAL AFTERMATH'
John Horenstein & Stanley Trybulskf "
A. Introduction
The principle of "one person, one vote," arose relatively late
in the constitutional history of the United States and resulted from
the civil rights movement of the late 1950's early 1960's. This
principle mandates that legislative electoral schemes adequately
reflect an individual's vote in proportion to the population in which
that individual is represented. Recent revisions to the New York
City Charter came about as a result of the application of this
principle to the manner in which voting power was being
apportioned in local government.
This article first discusses New York City's political
structure and the manner in which the citizens of its five boroughs
were represented under the old Board of Estimate. The article then
reviews the constitutional challenges to this electoral scheme which
led to a revision of New York City's Charter, and explains the
rationale behind these revisions and the impact on the methodology
of apportioning votes in local elections. Next, the article points out
unintended consequences resulting from these revisions which have
proven to be problematic. And finally, the article concludes that
while the Charter revision legally complies with the "one person,
one vote" principle, it is questionable whether the new legislative
scheme effectively provides voters with proportional representation.
Historically, the Supreme Court was reluctant to determine
the constitutionality of reapportionment of districts because it
considered the matter to be a "political thicket."' Civil rights
* Contributors: Linda Fox & Mark Fung, Brooklyn Law School ('BLS")
Class of 1994. Prepared for publication by Lewis S. Calderon, BLS Class of
1993 and David Karp, BLS Class of 1994. The authors wish to thank Margaret
Stix, BLS Class of 1995, for consultation on the topic.
** BLS Class of 1994.
Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 555 (1946).
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challenges to voting schemes only related to one's right to vote, not
to the individual value of that vote. It was not until the seminal
case of Baker v. Carr,2 in 1962, that the principle of "one person,
one vote" came under the direct scrutiny of the Supreme Court. In
Baker, the Court held that reapportionment of state assembly seats
was justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th
Amendment.3 Two years later, in Reynolds v. Sims,' the Court
held that the Equal Protection Clause covers all voters in the
election of state legislators, and that the seats in both houses of a
bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on the basis of
population.
The issue of local apportionment was further addressed by
the Supreme Court in Hadley v. Junior College Dist. of
Metropolitan Kansas City.5  In that case, the Court held that
whenever a local government selects its officials by popular
election, and these officials are selected from separate districts, the
Equal Protection Clause requires that each district be established on
a "one person, one vote" basis. Because New York City's political
structure is extremely diverse, in terms of ethnic makeup and
2 369 U.S. 186 (1962).(Plaintiffs, Tennessee voters, alleged that a 1901 state
statute which apportioned that state's General Assembly seats according to the
1900 federal census, and which had not been reapportioned since, was an
"arbitrary and capricious" reapportionment in violation of the 14th Amendment's
Due Process Clause).
' U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; § 1. "All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; not shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws."
4 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (Involving a challenge to the Alabama state legislative
apportionment scheme which was based on the 1900 census and which the
plaintiffs claimed discriminated against voters in counties whose population had
grown proportionately far more than that of other counties since the taking of
that census).
' 397 U.S. 50 (1970).
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geographical placement, the Baker, Reynolds, and Hadley decisions
were integral in shaping subsequent representation suits challenging
New York City's voting scheme. In Morris, et.al v. Board of
Estimate of New York City,6 the Supreme Court held that the
City's legislative electoral scheme under the Board of Estimate did
not accord all votes equal weight. Since this manner of
representation was in violation of the constitutionally mandated
"one person, one vote" principle, the voting scheme under the New
York City Charter was revised to comply with the Court's ruling.
B. New York City's Governmental Structure
New York City is comprised of five boroughs, each a
separate unit of the City and each a county of New York State.
The boroughs are Manhattan, the Bronx, Brooklyn, Queens and
Staten Island. The City has a tripartite system of government made
up of the Mayor, the City Council and the Board of Estimate. The
outer boroughs, the Bronx, Staten Island, Queens and Brooklyn had
been separate political entities until the end of the 19th century
when they merged with Manhattan (New York). The boroughs
retained many of their former powers, some of which were
coextensive with that of the Office of the Mayor and the City
Council. These powers were concentrated in the Board of
Estimate, the third leg of the political triumvirate which governed
the City, whose members were the five Borough Presidents, the
Mayor and the City Council President. The major powers wielded
by the Board of Estimate were budgetary and land use decision-
making capabilities.
Under the 1961 revision of the New York City Charter, the
Board of Estimate was expanded to include the City Comptroller.
Apportionment of the votes was as follows: the Mayor, the
Comptroller, and the President of the City Council each had four
votes; and the five Borough Presidents each had two votes. Thus,
while there were twenty-two votes in all, the borough presidents
only had ten votes, or less than 50% and the borough presidents of
Brooklyn and Queens, whose constituencies made up more than
6 489 U.S. 688 (1989).
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57% of the 1960 census, had only four of the twenty-two votes or
slightly more than 18% of the voting power.7  As will be
discussed below, the Baker v. Carr doctrine would eventually result
in a series of lawsuits which sought to bring New York City's
government in line with the "one person, one vote" principle.
C. The Politics of New York City
1. Political History
One of the earlier political ballyhoos in New York City
occurred in 1940 when a dispute arose between the staffs of then
Mayor Fiorello H. LaGuardia and City Council President Joseph T.
Sharkey regarding who would be the acting mayor when the
elected mayor was out of the city. This seemingly petty squabble
wound up in court because the vice-chairman of the City Council
sued the Board of Estimate and the Deputy Mayor over the right
to preside over the Board of Estimate as the designee of the City
Council president In reviewing the matter, the Appellate
Division held that the Deputy Mayor should preside in the absence
of his superior. The Court's sole dissenter, however, argued that
the City Charter appeared to be contradictory in its delegation of
powers, because one section of lhe Charter mandated that the
Council President assume mayoral duties in the mayor's absence
from the city, while another section allowed the deputy mayor to
sit on the Board of Estimate in those circumstances and exercise all
the mayor's powers except that of chairman.9
In 1942, another political struggle, this time between Mayor
LaGuardia and the City Council, wound up in court. During an
investigation by the City Council, the Council subpoenaed Mayor
LaGuardia to appear and testify before a special commission. The
mayor refused to appear and the mayor's refusal to comply with
the subpoena was subsequently reviewed by the Court of Appeals,
7 See table at note 14 infra.
s Sharkey v. LaGuardia, 259 A.D. 557 (1st Dept. 1940).
9 1d. at 571.
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New York State's highest court.' ° The Court of Appeals noted
that under the existing city charter, the Mayor and the City Council
were created as "mutually independent co-ordinate executive and
legislative branches of the city government." " The court held
that the City Council "is clothed with ample statutory powers to
compel the attendance of any officer" of the city administration and
the production of pertinent official documents by any officer. 2
Another conflict between branches of City government
surfaced in 1969 regarding the proposed electoral scheme for New
York City's Board of Education. In Oliver v. Board of
Education,'3 the constitutionality of the election procedure for the
May, 1970, Board of Education seats was challenged in federal
court. Representation on the Board of Education resembled that of
the Board of Estimate, with one member to be elected by each of
the five boroughs and two members appointed by the mayor.
Unlike the Board of Estimate, however, neither the City Council
President nor the Comptroller were permitted to vote.
The plaintiffs in Oliver, residents and registered voters of
Brooklyn, argued that "one person, one vote" should be applied to
Board of Education elections. The plaintiffs' primary complaint
was that under the 1960 census, residents and registered voters of
the most populous county (Kings) had nearly eight times the
population of the least populous county (Richmond),' 4 yet each
10 Matter of LaGuardia v. Smith, 288 N.Y. 1 (1942).
"Id. at 2.
12 Id. at 3.
13 306 F. Supp. 1286 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
14 Id. at 1288
Borough 1960 Population
New York County (Manhattan) 1,698,281
Bronx County (Bronx) 1,424,815
Kings County (Brooklyn) 2,627,319
Queens County (Queens) 1,809,578
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borough had equal representation on the Board. The plaintiffs
maintained that this population disparity amounted to a denial of
equal protection to Brooklyn voters, despite the fact that the Board
of Education had no taxing power, and was thus not a
governmental body required to comply with the "one person-one
vote" principle under Reynolds.
The court agreed with the plaintiffs and held that Reynolds
v. Sims 5 did apply to school board elections. The court
specifically noted that the board "has broad powers to run the city
schools" and even though New York City granted some autonomy
to boards of local school districts, the board retained overall
control. 6 The lack of taxing power by the board was not crucial
to the court's decision." The court, however, refused to enter an
injunction against the upcoming election, preferring instead to
retain jurisdiction of the case while allowing the state legislature an
opportunity to amend the statute.
The court further stated that the "one-person, one vote"
doctrine did not apply to the interim Board of Education because
its members were appointed by the five Borough Presidents who
were themselves elected in a manner that complied with the "one
person, one vote" requirement. Since the "choice of members of
the county school board did not involve an election and since none
was required for these non-legislative offices, the principle of 'one
man, one vote' has no relevancy."'" This, then was the political
background into which the "one person, one vote" controversy
would one day interject itself.
2. The Effect of Budgetary Politics On The
Richmond County (Staten Island) 221,991
'5 See 377 U.S. 533 supra note 4.
16 1d. at 1290-91.
17 Id. at 1291.
"s Id. at 1289 (quoting Sailors v. Board of Education of the County of Kent,
387 U.S. 105, 111 (1967)).
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Representational Structure of New York City
Under the revised 1961 New York City Charter, the budget
making power of the Board of Estimate did not allow the Board to
either draft or revoke a budget which was not subject to change by
the City Council or the Mayor. The Charter authorized the mayor
to prepare an expense budget which he would then submit to the
Board of Estimate and the City Council. Although the City
Council was the body "vested with the legislative power of the
city,""9 both the Council and the Board of Estimate were merely
reactive to the executive branch. They had little or no input into
the mayor's budget-making process and could not prepare a budget
on their own. While either the Board of Estimate or the Council
could alter the original budget by adding or eliminating items, the
mayor could veto any changes he disapproved of.20  These
changes were reflected in the final budget unless the mayor's veto
was overridden.2
The veto override required a two-thirds vote of both the
City Council and the Board of the Estimate, with the voting in
concurrent terms. The Board's twenty-two votes were comprised
of two from each borough president and four each for the Mayor,
the Comptroller and the City Council President. To make the veto
override even more difficult, the 1961 charter withdrew the
mayor's four votes from the Board of Estimate's twenty-two, thus
basing the two-thirds override requirement on only a total of
eighteen votes. Yet, the mayor could still cast his four votes
against a veto override. Since all the borough presidents combined
only had ten votes, an alliance between the Mayor, the Council
President and the Comptroller could foil any override attempt.
Without an alliance with the City Council President or the
Comptroller, all the Borough Presidents together were still short
two votes and thus, would be unable to override the mayor's veto.
19 NEw YORK CITY, N.Y. CHARTER Chapter 2, § 21 (1961) (same provision
in 1991 Charter).
I0 d. at § 120.
21 Id. at § 121(b).
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On the other hand, if the City Council President or the Comptroller
challenged the mayor's veto, they would need the votes of at least
four of the five Borough President on the Board to override. It
was under this scenario that the borough presidents had bargaining
power, enabling them to obtain favors for supporting the mayor.
In Bergerman v. Lindsay,22 borough presidents who
represented the Bronx and Brooklyn, two boroughs in which the
population was grossly disproportionate to the representation,
brought legal action challenging the election process of the Board
of Estimate. The New York Court of Appeals applied the Avery
test," which requires the court to determine whether a local unit
comprised of multiple members (the Board of Estimate) had
"general governmental powers over the entire geographic area"
under the "one-person, one-vote" principle.24  The Court of
Appeals focused on the budget-making role of the Board and
concluded that it was not of such legislative character as to prohibit
the selection of executives from boroughs of unequal sizes. 2
The Court in Bergerman further held that the Board of
Estimate did not function as a legislature within the meaning of the
drafters of the Charter because of its limited role in the budgetary
process. The court noted that the City Council was expressly
2 25 N.Y.2d 405 (1969).
23 Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 485 (1968). In Avery, the
plaintiffs, residents of Midland County, Texas, challenged the makeup of the
County Commissioners Court, which was the governing body. The plaintiffs
alleged that their rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th
Amendment had been violated due to a "gross disparity in population" among the
four districts: one district which included the city of Midland had a population
of 67,906; the other districts had populations of 852; 414; and 828.
24 Id.
2 'The Board of Estimate in its present statutory frame is the result of a
purpose to apportion and distribute budget-making among city executives and
legislative officers. In structure and composition it seems quite unique." 25
N.Y.2d 405, 411.
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established as "the local legislative body of the city,"2 6 and
concluded that "the Board of Estimate must be regarded as an
indigenous local governmental institution which neither fits fully
into the role of a legislative body nor has "general governmental
powers over entire geographic area" as required by Avery.27 Thus,
the Board of Estimate did not fall into the category of
governmental bodies required to comply with the "one-person, one-
vote" principle. Furthermore, twelve of the twenty-two votes
(those of the Mayor, the City Council President and Comptroller)
arose out of city-wide elections, and the voting process for these
elections did adhere to the "one person, one vote" principle.
In 1981, those arguing in favor of "one person, one vote"
were successful in overturning the election of at-large members
to the City Council. 28  Under Sections 22 and 23 of the old
Charter, the City Council consisted of a president elected on a city-
wide basis, thirty-five members to be elected from districts that
were subject to redistricting after each federal decennial census,
and two at-large members from each of the five boroughs (one
Democrat and one Republican). That year, in Andrews v. Koch,29
registered voters of Kings County, including one black voter and
one Hispanic voter, sued the City arguing that the six-fold disparity
in population between Brooklyn and Staten Island resulted "in a
debasement or dilution of their voting rights...as effectively as
would a total denial of suffrage." 3° Basing their complaint on the
Reynolds v. Sims line of decisions, 1 the plaintiffs alleged that the
at-large elections violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th
Amendment.
26 Bergman, 25 N.Y.2d at 410 quoting NEW YORK CITY, N.Y. CHARTER
Chapter 2, §§ 21, 27 (1962).
27 25 N.Y.2d 405, 411.
28 Andrews v. Koch, 528 F. Supp. 246 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
29 528 F. Supp. 246.
3 Id. at 248.
31 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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The defendants, Mayor Edward Koch, City Council
President Carol Bellamy and other city officials, argued that
"statistical variations alone cannot displace legitimate political goals
which non-proportional voting systems may constitutionally seek
to advance." 32  According to the city officials, the at-large
electoral scheme met two desirable goals: (1) the ensured inclusion
of minority (Republican) representation from each borough on the
overwhelmingly Democratic Council; and (2) the assurance of
adequate representation of borough-wide interests "in replacement
of the diminished powers of the Board of Estimate. '' 3  The city
officials further argued that the equal at-large representation was
necessary to maintain "detente" among the boroughs. 34
The court rejected the latter argument, citing Avery v.
Midland County5 and Abate v Mundt' and noted that there was
a total deviation from population equality of 50.4%, more than four
times the 11.9% maximum deviation approved by the Abate
court.37 The Court held that such deviation was unconstitutional
because "a voter in the Bronx or Staten Island gets substantially
more representation for his or her ballot than a voter in Brooklyn
or Queens," and this, the court held, was unconstitutional.3'
It has been argued that by the 1980's the City Council had
become merely a rubber-stamp for the administration. The Council
no longer dared assert its rights as elected voices of the people the
way it had done fifty years earlier when it subpoenaed Mayor
LaGuardia. In fact, the last three mayors of New York, John V.
Lindsay, Abraham Beame, and Edward I. Koch all misused
32 Andrews, 528 F.Supp. at 248.
33 Id. at 249.
341d. at 251, n. 8.
35 25 N.Y.2d 405 (1969).
36403 U.S. 182 (1971).
37 Andrews, 528 F. Supp. at 250 (citing Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182, 184).
38 Id. at 251.
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executive orders that went beyond the stated legislative policy of
the council, without any objection by the council members. The
Council silently acquiesced this usurpation of their policy-making
capacity and the executive orders were all struck down by the
courts only after being challenged by private groups. 9 These
executive orders, all involving anti-discrimination promulgations
were enacted by the mayors, while the City Council, the body
empowered to legislate, neither legislated nor protested this
usurpation of their power.
D. Legal Challenges to New York City's Structure
1. The Challenge to the 1974 Statewide Redistricting Plan
Before and during the drive to reform New York City's
charter, a series of voter and taxpayer-launched legal challenges to
other elected bodies were taking place. 4° These challenges were
based on specific allegations that the constituencies in question
were not receiving representation consistent with constitutionally
" Matter of Broidrick v. Lindsay, 39 N.Y.2d 641 (1976); Matter of Fullilove
v. Beame, 48 N.Y.2d 376 (1979); Subcontractors Trade Ass'n v. Koch, 62
N.Y.2d 422 (1984); Under 21, Catholic Home Bureau for Dependent Children
v. City of N.Y. 65 N.Y.2d 344 (1985); Salvation Army v. Koch, 65 N.Y.2d 422
(1985).
40 See, e.g., Coalition for Education in District One v. Board of Elections of
City of New York, 370 F.Supp 42 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)(invalidating a school board
election on the grounds of racial discrimination); Campbell v. Board of
Education, 310 F. Supp. 94 (E.D.N.Y. 1970) (holding that proportional
representation on local New York City school board did not deny equal
protection since there was no identifiable group discriminated against); Franklin
v. Mandeville, 32 A.D.2d 953 (2d Dept. 1969) (holding that weighted voting plan
for-county board of supervisors of Nassau County violated "one person, one
vote" concept); MacKenzie v. Travia, 55 Misc.2d 1016 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968)
(holding that "one man, one vote" was not applicable to members of the Board
of Regents).
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mandated reapportionment 4' and that their apportioned
representation violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
In the 1970 federal decennial census, New York's
congressional delegation was reduced from 41 to 39.42 As
required by the New York State Constitution, the state legislature
enacted a reapportionment scheme for the Congressional, State
Assembly and State Senate.43 Traditionally the state Assembly has
been dominated by the Democratic Party, and the State Senate by
the Republican Party. When the issue of redistricting arose, it
became obvious that a compromise was necessary. A redistricting
plan was adopted in 1972 which led to districts with low minority
representation. 44 So low, in fact, that the districts violated the
Voting Rights Act of 1965. 45 As a result, in New York State v.
United States,4 the District Court for District of Columbia47
41 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 ("...The actual Enumeration shall be made
within three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States,
and within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such a manner as they shall
by Law direct...").
42 Flateau v. Anderson, 537 F. Supp. 257, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
4' N.Y. CONST. art's. III & IV. (requiring adjustment of Congressional,
Assembly and State Senate districts after each federal decennial census).
4"Flateau, 537 F.Supp. at 259.
4' 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1965).
46 65 F.R.D. 10 (D.D.C. 1974).
' Flateau, 537 F. Supp. at 260, n.5. ("Section 5 (of 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c)}
provides in pertinent part:
(W)henever a State or political subdivision ... shall enact or
seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to
voting, or standard, practice or procedure with respect to
voting different from that in force or effect on November 1,
1972, such State or subdivision may institute an action in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia for a
declaratory judgment that such qualification, prerequisite,
standard, practice,or procedure does not have the purpose and
New York City Charter
entered an order placing the counties of Kings, New York and the
Bronx under the provisions of the Act. Then, in Flateau v.
Anderson,as the Southern District approved changes in the
boundaries of 16 of 150 Assembly districts, 8 out of 60 Senate
districts and 4 out of the 39 congressional districts.49
In Flateau, the plaintiffs, a group of registered voters,
brought a class action suit opposing the reapportionment.5' The
plaintiffs claimed that because of the substantial increase in
minority populations (particularly in the Bronx and Brooklyn) in
face of an overall decrease in New York State's population, the
existing (1974) reapportionment plan violated the Reynolds v. Sims
rule which guaranteed the opportunity for equal protection of all
voters in the election of state legislators and required that the seats
in both houses of a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned
on a population basis. The plaintiffs were joined by the Puerto
Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund which also charged that
the existing state legislative district lines were violative of the 15th
Amendment and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. 51  The
defendants' position at trial placed them in a quandary. They
conceded that if the apportionment plan was enacted, it would
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment.52 On
the other hand, one defendant, Senate Majority Leader Anderson,
argued that under the state's constitution, the legislature was
allowed to take up to six years after the taking of the federal
will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to
vote on account of race or color ...").
537 F. Supp. 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
"9 Id. at 260. (The New York amendment was codified in 1974 N.Y. LAWS
c. 588, c. 589).
50 537 F. Supp. 257.
51 Id. at 259.
5'2 Id. at 261.
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census to arrive at a new apportionment scheme, 3 and was
therefore not required to immediately amend the electoral scheme.
The court held that any alleged infringement of the right to
vote requires close scrutiny.54  It concluded that since the
defendant state legislative leaders concurrence was needed to effect
any reapportionment plan, such reapportionment would not occur
without the court's intervention. 5 The court further noted that the
"substantial equality" requirement of Reynolds was applicable and
stated that the deviations in the districts were "of such a magnitude,
that if presently enacted would constitute per se violations of the
equal protection principle of 'one person, one vote.' 5 6
2. The Morris Challenge to the Board of Estimate
At the same time that the redistricting plan was being
litigated, the residents of Brooklyn successfully challenged the
apportionment of voting power on the Board of Estimate. In
Morris, et.al v. Board of Estimate of New York City,57 the
plaintiffs brought a class action suit on behalf of registered voters,
alleging that the citizens of Brooklyn were grossly under-
represented on the Board of Estimate in New York City.5" The
district court held: (1) there was indeed malapportionment of voting
power, (2) the Abate test was the appropriate method to determine
the deviation from the court standard; (3) the City had the burden
of proving its rationale for such a gross deviation; and (4) the
City's expressed reasons not to change the Board's voting scheme
did not significantly outweigh the harm done by the departure from
" Id. at 259.
4 Id. at 263.
" Id. at 262.
56 Id. at 264.
57 489 U.S. 688 (1989).
551 F. Supp. 652 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
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the "one person, one vote standard." 9
On appeal, 6° the Second Circuit rejected the City's
arguments that at-large city-wide elected officials were improperly
excluded from the computation of the deviation (which, if included
would have reduced the impermissible deviation), and that the lack
of weight granted to the City's asserted interests in maintaining the
Board of Estimate contradicted the Court's decisions in other local
governmental schemes. Unsatisfied with that result, the City
appealed to the Supreme Court in 1989.61 The Supreme Court
upheld the determinations of the District Court and refused to find
that the Second Circuit had erred in its reconciliation of the
relationship of the "one person, one vote" standard" with the New
York City Board of Estimate's composition, and thus, the issue was
remanded to the District Court.62
3. Methodology of Reapportiomnent under the Charter
Revision
The immediate question facing the parties on remand in the
District Court related to the method used by the court in
determining the deviation from the constitutionally mandated
standard of "one person, one vote." A second issue was whether
or not New York City had a legitimate interest in maintaining a
local governmental institution such as the Board of Estimate.
The plaintiffs in Morris, all Brooklyn residents, argued that
their vote was devalued because of the composition of the new
Board of Estimate.63 They favored a scheme that would weigh
the Borough Presidents' vote on the Board in proportion to their
respective borough populations or, in the alternative, they wanted
" 592 F. Supp. 1462 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); 647 F. Supp. 1463 (E.D.N.Y. 1986)
(on remand).
60 831 F.2d 384 (2nd Cir. 1987).
61 489 U.S. 688 (1989).
6 647 F. Supp. 1463 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
63 592 F. Supp. at 1464.
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the court to determine that any deviation from proportion would be
computed by a population based method.64 This would create a
presumption under the "one person, one vote" standard that
Brooklyn, which had six times the population of Staten Island,
would receive six times the representation.
The defendant in the case, the Board of Estimate of the City
of New York, although aware of the equal protection arguments the
plaintiff made, argued that no change was required for the devia-
tions in relative voting strength.65  They based their claim on
methodology approved in other voting rights suits such as the
Benzhaf Index, a mathematical analysis under which one can
determine the percentage that one voting district deviates from
another in relation to their respective populations. 6 The defen-
dants focused on the relative power of voters in the various
boroughs to influence board decisions. This approach involved
recognizing the weighted voting of the three city-wide members
and aggregating the voters total effect, and a claim that the Benzhaf
Index showed a only a 30.6% deviation.67 The court rejected the
defendant's methodology as "theoretical." '
One intervenor-defendant, Frank V. Ponterio, a Staten Island
resident, argued that the Board of Estimate was analogous to a
"floterial district," the super-district being the city and the sub-
districts the five boroughs. The District court rejected this
reasoning, holding:
By analogy or otherwise, the Board is not akin to a "single
floterial district". . . In Davis v.Mann, 377 U.S. 678, 686 n.2,
84 S.Ct. 1441, 1445 n.2, the court defined that model ...
[F]loterial district ... refer[s] to a legislative district which in-
592 F. Supp. at 1465.
65 Morris, 592 F. Supp. at 1462.
6 Note, Fair and Effective Representation; Power to the People, 26
HASTINGS L.J. 190, 195 (1974).
67 Morris, 592 F.Supp at 1470.
8 Id. at 1473-74.
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cludes. . several separate districts ... which independently
would not be entitled to additional representation but whose
conglomerate population entitles the entire-area to another seat
in the particular legislative body being apportioned."
In citing qualifying voting schemes in other jurisdictions,
the District Court also found that the Board of Estimate overvalued
the city-wide officers' power and undervalued the borough
representatives' power to determine any particular outcome. 70
The District Court relied on the Abate test, which required that:
The maximum percentage deviation is determined by adding
the percentage deviation above the population mean of the
district with the greatest number of voters to the percentage
deviation below the population mean of the district with the
fewest number of voters.7'
In applying the test, the District Court found the individual
inequalities to be:
Borough Population Deviation
Brooklyn 2,230,936 -57.7%
Queens 1,891,325 -33.7%
Manhattan 1,427,533 - 0.9%
Bronx 1,169,115 k17.4%
Staten Island 352,121 k75.2%
Computing the -57.7% variance of Brooklyn as the most
under-represented borough with the +75.2% variance of Staten
Island as the most over-represented borough, the maximum
deviation is 132.9%. 72
The court specifically excluded the at-large representatives
from consideration under this plan, rejecting the City's Benzhaf
691d. at 1468.
7° Id. at 1471.
7' Abate V. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182, 184 n.1 (1971).
7Id. at 1475.
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Index and Ponterio's "floterial district" arguments.73 The court
qualified its result with the example of Travis v. King,74 where the
apportionment scheme in Hawaii was upheld, even though it
retained separate island-based representative districts, a voting
scheme unique to the Hawaiian islands.75 The King case was an
example of geographic and economic insularity. The Court ordered
the parties to submit a list of agreed upon and disputed policies
presently served by the board to determine whether there were
legitimate interests being furthered by the current composition of
the Board of Estimate. 76
4. RATIONALE
As relevant to those issues, defendants in the "Joint
Stipulation of Policies and Interest" offered a list of considerations
in support of maintaining the status quo:
1. Absence of any demonstrable injury to the populations of
the more heavily populated boroughs as a consequence....
2. Uniqueness of the Board as a form of local government
because of its composition and voting allocation.
3. Meaningful representation of the citizens of the lesser
populated boroughs, especially Staten Island.
4. Preservation of the boroughs as legitimate representational
entities in local government.
5. Use of natural and historical borough boundaries to define
representational entities in local government.
6. Historical treatment of boroughs as separate governmental
entities.
7. Necessity of retaining borough representation on the Board
in light of abolition of such representation on the City
7 Morris, 592 F.Supp at 1469.
7' 552 F. Supp. 554, 560 (D. Haw. 1982).
7 Morris, 592 F.Supp at 1476.
76 Id. at 1477.
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Council.
8. Effectiveness of a Board composed of only eight members.
9. The long standing dual role of borough representatives as
both Borough President and the member of the Board.
10. Coordination of City and Borough governmental authority
and responsibility.
11. Ability to balance differing interests and needs, and to
accommodate development and long term planning require-
ments of both the boroughs and the City as a whole.
12. Flexibility to meet changing societal needs, particularly in
a large municipality whose local government is complex.
13. Correlation between the functions of the Board and the
impact of those functions upon the boroughs, particularly in
regard to the formulation of the capital budget, in order to
assure that different parts of the City get their fair share of
service contracts and capital budget allocation which might
otherwise go to those portions of the City contributing the
most tax dollars.
14. Necessity and effectiveness of borough representation in
local government as an intermediate size entity, with city-
wide representation being larger and community board
representation being smaller.
15. Ability of the Board as presently constituted to eliminate
undue concentration of executive power and to supplement
the City Council, which retains the general legislative
power of the city.
16. Effectuation of delegated police-power responsibilities.
17. Equality of voting power on the Board among the boroughs
as boroughs. 77
In an extended analysis of the defendants' concerns, the
Court recognized the historic concerns of numbers 5, 6 and 9, "the
Board's time rooted membership evidences on-going borough
residential political consciousness."78  The court respected
political boundaries as a legitimate concern as well as upholding
77Morris v. Board of Estimate, 647 F. Supp. 1463, 1468.
"a Id. at 1472.
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the integrity of political subdivision, numbers 4, 6, 7, 9, and 1429
The District Court analyzed the City's claims which dealt
with effectiveness (numbers 4, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14) and found
that under the New York State Constitution s° "effective local self-
government and intergovernmental cooperation are expectations of
the people of the state."'  Citing the fiscal crisis of the mid-
1970's as an example, the Court found that the Board dealt
effectively with large and complex problems.8 2 However in those
stipulated concerns dealing with meaningful representation,
numbers 4, 7, 9, and 14, the District court found it difficult to
formulate an appropriate definition that would fit the Board of
Estimate. The "one borough, one vote" formulation is antithetical
to the "one person, one vote" doctrine. 3 Because of historical
considerations and natural boundaries, the retention of the boroughs
as political subdivisions was regarded by the court as a "legitimate
consideration., 8 4 The court's analysis, while validating many of
the City's concerns, lightened but did not relieve the City of the
burden of justifying the Board composition. The court said the
City must also demonstrate that no alternative plan would satisfac-
torily embrace the legitimate considerations and diminish the
deviation, and ordered the Board's voting plan to be recast with all
deliberate speed.'
E. The New Charter
On November 7, 1989, the residents of New York City
"9 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 578-579 (1964).
'0 N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (McKinney 1969).
s' Morris, 647 F.Supp 1463, 1471.
8' Id. at 1472.
' Id. at 1473.
4 Id. at 1474.
" Id. at 1475.
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voted to adopt a new city charter.8 Under the new Charter, the
Board of Estimate was abolished while the City Council was
expanded and given wider powers. 7 The most important differ-
ence under the new charter is that final authority for land use
planning and zoning policy has become the City Council's
responsibility.
Procedurally, all comprehensive land use planning and
zoning proposals and urban renewal plans must go to the Council.
The Council is the final arbiter when the City Planning Commis-
sion approves an application over the objection of a Community
Board and a Borough President. The Council must abide by its
Fair Share doctrine, which requires it to consider whether commu-
nities would be overburdened or undeserved by council actions
when city facilities are at issue. Under the new charter, land
use procedures are dealt with differently than under the Board of
Estimate, and this has influenced the style and voting patterns of
the new council. Community Boards are involved in the process
at an earlier stage than under the Board of Estimate, and are thus
supplying the Community Boards with more information than they
had previously. While giving local community officials a greater
opportunity to shape the broad outlines of a project, the new
Charter gives them less influence on critical details at the end.
Despite this drawback, some Community Boards fear that without
the Board of Estimates' Calendar of Meetings, they will not be
informed about important political issues in time to create proper
position statements. In addition, land use planning and zoning has
become an essential part of the Borough President's role, and all
Borough Presidents have increased their land use planning and
zoning budgets.88
' Alan Finder, Overhaul of New York City Charter is Approved, Polls Show,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1989, at BI.
87 1d.
8' The 1991-1992 Borough President's land use budgets were:
Boroujh Staff Budget Housing
Allocation
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F. AN EXAMPLE OF THE PROBLEMS CAUSED BY
THE ADOPTION OF THE CHARTER
One similarity between the present City Council and the
former Board of Estimate is the political maneuvering that counters
the effect of proportional representation. On high profile matters,
such as land use decisions concerning the construction of incinera-
tors within a community, members of the Board of Estimate have
often followed the lead of colleagues whose districts were most
affected by the Board of Estimate's action. This style of voting is
referred to as legislative parochialism. The move away from
legislative parochialism is implicit in the Supreme Court's charac-
terization of the "one person, one vote" doctrine, and although
many Council members argue that this voting trend is on the
decline, it is important to analyze the Council's decision-making
process in high profile matters to determine whether the Council
has, in fact, adopted a new style or is actually maintaining the
legislative parochialism of its predecessor. This section discusses
the manner in which the City Council dealt with a major land-use
decision, and shows that the decline in legislative parochialism did
not necessarily result in proportional representation.
There are - a number of factors other than legislative
parochialism that influence the decision-making process in the City
Bronx 9 $350,000. $4XXf
Brooklyn* 2 (Director & N/A $40D=
Assistant)
$10,600.000 on water
front and industrial
parks.
Manhattan 12 $475,000. N/A
Queens 8 plus 40 $340,000. $32X=XX
person task
force to
review zoning.
Staten Island 2 $154,000. $600,000.
* Brooklyn has maintained the Borough Hall specialist system, which makes
budget numbers difficult to derive. Claudia H. Deutsch, How New Charter
Effects Lat Use, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1992, at Sec. 10, p. 3.
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Council. Council members have a duty to further the interests of
their constituents while at the same time, they must also develop
consensus to pursue the city's overall interests. Also, under the
new City Charter, the voting of Council Members is influenced by
the powerful position of the Council Speaker.. These factors played
an integral role in the Council's recent adoption of a long-term
waste management policy for the City, which was approved in
August, 1992.89
In 1989, the City adopted legislation stating that the City
recycle 1400 tons of garbage per day by April, 1991 and 2100 tons
(25% of total waste per day), by 1994.' However by March of
1991 the city was only collecting 1150 tons of recycled material.9'
Faced with budget cutbacks, unrealistic goals and public apathy,
the city was forced to build incinerators instead of pursuing the
recycling plan. The Mayor's office was faced with the unpopular
alternative of building incinerators because of: (1) the failed
recycling program; (2) the Fresh Kills (Staten Island) landfill is
nearing capacity and will have to be closed within ten years; and
(3) the potential congressional prohibition on the export of waste
to neighboring states. In addition, the State legislature mandated
that the City develop a long term waste management proposal.
At the end of March, 1991, the Mayor proposed a waste
management plan. This proposal included the development of a
city-wide recycling program which is to be completed by April,
1994 that requires the City to recycle 41% of its total daily
waste;92 the construction of one super-incinerator at the Brooklyn
Navy Yard and the upgrading of the City's three existing incinera-
89 Michael Specter, Pact on Garbage in New York City, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
18, 1992, at Al.
90 Administrative Code of the City of New York § 16-140(2).
9' Allan R. Gold, Recycling Program in New York Falls Behind Second Year
Goals, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1991, at A26.
92 Calvin Sims, Dinkins Offers Changes in Solid Waste Disposal, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 31, 1992, at B3.
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tors so that 18% of the city's daily waste will be burnt; 93 and a
reduction in the amount of waste that is either sent to the Fresh
Kills landfill or exported to neighboring states. The waste
management plan also mandated the construction of six recycling
processing centers and four composting plants for institutional
waste.9'
Five days prior to the release of the Mayor's waste
management plan, the Council took its first step in influencing the
city's long-term policy goals in this area. While the Charter does
not explicitly require the Council to consider long-term policy
plans, the Council voted for jurisdiction over the waste manage-
ment plan by requiring the Mayor to submit the plan to the
Council. At this point, most Council members objected to the
waste management plan because too much emphasis was placed on
incineration and not enough on guarantees that the City would live
up to its recycling commitments.95
Most Council members based their objections on strong
grassroots opposition to incineration. This opposition came from
two different factions. Environmental groups, who were opposed
to either all incineration or only to excessive use of- incineration,
objected to the Mayor's plan on the grounds that he was reneging
on his campaign promise to prevent incinerator construction.'
Also, communities adjacent to the proposed Brooklyn Navy Yard
Incinerator and the City's three existing incinerators objected to the
waste management plan, claiming that the pollution created by the
incinerators would damage their health.97 Most Council members
opted to protect their constituents rather than face the harsh reality
that the City had to burn its garbage, and thus refused to go along
with the Mayor's plan for waste management.
" Allison Mitchell, Groups Vow to Battle Incinerator, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29,
1992, at BI.
9" Calvin Sims supra note 91.
95 Id.
9 Allison Mitchell, supra note 92.
97Id.
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In July, 1992, with over thirty members of the Council still
opposing the Mayor's waste management plan, the Council voted
to extend the time limit for approval of the plan six more weeks.9"
It is during this six week period that the other two factors, the
influence of Council Speaker Vallone and the development of
consensus, affected the decision-making process of the Council.
Before proceeding to an analysis of the Council's compro-
mise with the Mayor's office, it is essential to understand the
power of the Council Speaker. The Speaker hires and administers
the Council's central staff, which is comprised of 247 analysts,
lawyers and investigators. 9 In addition, the Speaker controls the
purse strings for stipends, the appointment of committee chairper-
sons and the Council's formal agenda. Critics of Speaker Vallone
accuse his appointees of being fiercely loyal to the Speaker's
interests while ignoring the interests of the Council members to
whom they were as-signed."° The resulting power of the Speak-
er is felt when high profile issues, such as the final vote on the
waste management plan, come before the Council, and he is
capable of influencing the Council's decision.
In late July and early August, 1992, a compromise between
the. Mayor's office and Speaker Vallone was reached. °'0 The
compromise called for the closing of two incinerators, one in
Greenpoint, Brooklyn and the other in Maspeth, Queens; the
beginning of a city-wide, curbside recycling plan to be in place by
the Fall of 1993 instead of April, 1994; the construction of a super-
incinerator at the Brooklyn Navy Yard; the elimination of the
Staten Island ashfill; and the exportation of toxic waste produced
by the Brooklyn Navy Yard's incinerator. °2 During the negotia-
s James C. McKinley, Jr., Council Postpones Action on Garbage Plans,
N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 1992, at B2.
9 James C. McKinley, Jr., New Council is Becoming More Powerful, N.Y.
TIMES, July 28, 1992, at B1.
10 ld.
01 Michael Specter, supra note 88.
Id.
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tion of this compromise, there was an attempt to rally Council
members from Staten Island and Queens by proposing legislation
which would benefit their constituencies as a means of countering
the opposition of Council members from Brooklyn and Manhattan.
For example, proposed legislation eliminating the ashfill site
in Staten Island ensured support for the compromise plan from
Staten Island members. Similarly, Queens Council Member Walter
L. McCaffery, an outspoken critic of incineration, was induced to
vote for the compromise plan because his constituents would
directly benefit from proposed legislation to close the Maspeth
Incinerator. a03 Proponents of the compromise plan even attempt-
ed to gain support from Brooklyn districts adjacent to the Greenpo-
int Incinerator by proposing that it be closed down. However, the
Council Members representing these districts, Victor L. Robles and
Mary Pinkett, voted against the compromise." 4 Also, as an
appeal to garner the vote of Brooklyn's Spring Creek Council
member, Howard Berman, Chairperson of the Council's Finance
Committee, the plan's supporters included a ban on the construc-
tion of incinerators in Spring Creek, Brooklyn.
One obstacle to the ratification of this compromise had been
the mayor's refusal to make the construction of the Brooklyn Navy
Yard's super incinerator in 1996 dependent on full compliance with
the city-wide, curbside recycling program)Ys However, during
final negotiation of the compromise, the mayor agreed that the
construction of the super-incinerator at the Brooklyn Navy Yard
would be dependant on the City's compliance with a comprehen-
sive recycling program. The Mayor's compromise insured approval
of the plan because now Council members could vote for the plan
knowing that the city would be forced to comply with the recycling
portion of the plan in order to build incinerators. As a result of
this compromise the Council appropriated $300,000.00 towards the
recycling program, nearly ten times the amount allocated under
103 Michael Spector, Hope, Off Ash Heap, New York City Fought Over an
Incinerator, But Real Focus is on Recycling, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1992 at Al.
104 id.
1o5 Id.
New York City Charter
prior legislation. 1°6
The waste management plan was approved on August 27,
1992, by a vote of 36 to 15, and resulted in both positive and
negative criticism of the Council's decision-making process. 7
According to supporters, the passage of the waste management plan
shows that the Council is prepared to influence long-term city
policy and challenge the mayor on long-term decisions, and also
that some members of the Council are willing to compromise and
establish political consensus when it results in a greater benefit to
the city. However, many Council members from Brooklyn believe
they were betrayed on the incineration issue. These Council
members claim that as local community members and politicians,
they are best able to assess the needs of their communities. They
therefore felt that their opinions should have been accorded serious
consideration when determining the outcome of such an important
issue. They argue that legislative parochialism has merit where the
views of certain communities are at odds. While, Speaker
Vallone's power brokering is not far removed from the Board of
Estimate's legislative parochialism, it can presently be legitimated
by virtue of his position's power. Therefore, Council members
need to find a balance between preventing legislative parochialism,
pursuing their constituent's interests, establishing consensus on
long-term City interests and responding to the balance of power
between the Council and its Speaker.
Conclusion
Democracy is a human endeavor. The Constitution, the
courts, and the new Charter can all provide the mechanisms around
which the principle of "one person, one vote" can be put into
practice. However, the application of this principle cannot necessar-
ily guarantee that all voters will profit from proportional represen-
tation. Therefore, it is up to elected officials to ensure that their
constituents, in New York City and elsewhere, have a voice in
106 Id.
107 Alan Finder, In a Vote at Sunrise, a New Dawn for New York Politics,
N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 28, 1992, at B3.
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local government, and ultimately, it is the voters at election time
who must remedy any perceived shortcomings in their representa-
tion.
The final question to be addressed is whether the conse-
quences of the charter revision, such as the elimination of the
Board of Estimate and the expansion of the size and political
power of the City Council, have brought New York City's govern-
mental process in line with the apportionment goal of "fair and
effective representation" and the "one person, one vote" standards
under Reynolds and the "rational consideration" standard under
Avery. Increasing the size of the Council as a means of more
equitably distributing power is the obvious step towards effectuat-
ing the "one person, one vote" standard. For example, Brooklyn,
the borough with the largest population, should have the greatest
representation in City government.
Under the current scheme, Brooklyn has the most of
representatives in City government and thus the City is complying
with the proportional requirements of "one person, one vote."
However, despite this "proportional representation," the Council
decided to place the super-incinerator in the Brooklyn Navy Yard.
The Brooklyn delegation was outvoted by the other boroughs
because Brooklyn's interests were outweighed by the need for a
comprehensive waste management plan for the entire city.
Discontent still exists in the boroughs over a variety of
issues besides the construction of the Brooklyn Navy Yard's super
incinerator, such as secession from the City by Staten Island and
dissatisfaction with central school board policy in Queens. Brook-
lyn Borough President Howard Golden, who opposed the 1990
Charter Revision, has now proposed that the State Legislature
create a Commission on Borough Governance."t  Golden sug-
gests that the boroughs regain the political clout, vis a vis the
mayor, which was lost when the Board of Estimate was abolished.
He also proposes a decentralization of land use and budgetary
allocations that begin at the borough level rather than in the
mayor's office. Borough President Golden has received support
l0s Allison Mitchell, Borough Presidents Seek Stronger Role in City. N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 24, 1993 at B2.
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from Queens Borough President Claire Shulman and Staten Island
Borough President Guy V. Molinari'09 in his quest, however, City
Council Speaker Peter Vallone is opposed to the creation of such
a commission. Silent on the matter are the City council members
who look to Vallone for appointments on the Council committees
as well as for filling patronage positions for their supporters.
In Staten Island, the move for secession will go to vote in
the November, 1993 elections."0 With the secession issue come
a host of legal problems such as whether New York City property
in Staten Island can be taken over by a new municipality without
violating the Takings Clause of the Constitution, and which of the
services constitutionally mandated by the old municipality must a
new municipality supply to its residents.
Finally, even the Charter's attempt to increase minority
representation has recently been legally challenged."' Richard
Ravitch, former chairman of the Charter Commission, brought a
suit against the City alleging the unconstitutionality of Section
50(b)(1) of the Charter, which created the racial makeup of the 15-
member commission empowered to draw the new Council districts.
The Charter provided that the commission include at least one
resident from each borough and members, of the racial and ethnic
minorities protected by the Federal Voting Rights Act "in propor-
tion as close as practicable, to the population in the city.""12 The
Council appointed eight members and the mayor appointed seven
members, with a resultant makeup of seven whites, four blacks,
three Hispanics and one Asian-American.
The District Court found that while the "inclusion of
minority viewpoints in a process will lead to a more fair and
evenhanded presentations of varying perspectives," the use of the
term "proportion" has "an unmistakable meaning" and "is, of itself,
109 id.
1IO Id.
I. Ravitch v. City of New York, 90 Civ. 5752 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
112 id.
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constitutionally suspect."' 3 The Court ruled that this was too
broad a remedy because it established "a rigid appointment system
keying appointment to population numbers and would stay in effect
indefinitely."" 4
Finally, it appears that even though the new City Charter
applies the "one person, one vote" principle, the internal mecha-
nism of New York City politics has not allowed its goal to be
realized. Minority representation has, in fact, significantly
increased. However, the overall goal of giving more voice to the
voter has instead created a second centralized power base in the
persona of the City Council Speaker. The larger boroughs, whose
populations should have put them in a leadership role in City
governance, are sometimes unable even to protect the unique needs
of their local citizenry and Brooklyn voters still remain without
"proportional representation" on the City Council.
113 Id.
114 Id.
